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Credit Access, Human Capital, and
Class Structure Mobility

W. BRUCE WYDICK

This paper examines the impact of microenterprise credit programs on class
structure mobility in developing countries. The paper develops a model that
endogenously generates an eight-fold class structure. Class membership is
determined by optimal choice of labour activity, which is a function of access to
credit and human capital endowments. Predictions from the model suggest that
better access to credit will foster upward class mobility among self-employed
entrepreneurs, and that this upward class mobility will be accentuated among
entrepreneurs with high levels of human capital. Theoretical predictions from
the model are compared with data on class structure mobility collected firsthand in western Guatemala. Empirical results show that upward class structure
mobility increases substantially with access to credit, and also suggest that the
combined effect of innate entrepreneurial ability and credit access has a greater
impact on upward class structure mobility than the interaction between formal
schooling and credit access.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The well-documented success of microenterprise credit programs in recent years has led
to an explosion of interest in their use as a tool for alleviating poverty and generating
economic growth in both developing and transitional economies.1

Evidence of this

unbridled enthusiasm for such programs occurred at a summit on microenterprise lending
sponsored by the Clinton Administration in January 1997. At this summit a consortium
of international aid agencies, commercial banks, and governmental authorities agreed on
a plan to direct $23.6 billion toward providing access to credit to 100 million
impoverished households by the year 2005.2 While numerous statistics have been
compiled regarding the impressive participation and repayment rates realised of many
microenterprise lending programs, there is a critical need for research that examines the
changes in economic behaviour of loan recipients after they obtain access to this credit.
This paper seeks to make a contribution in this area by examining the impact of
newfound access to credit on the class structure mobility among loan recipients.
Specifically, this paper develops a model which predicts potential differences in upward
class structure mobility between loan recipients with different levels of human capital.
It then compares the predictions from the model with data showing the class mobility of
358 entrepreneurs in western Guatemala after the introduction of microenterprise lending
within the region.
Though some may have eschewed an economic analysis of class structure
mobility for its roots in Marxist ideology,3 policy makers concerned with developing and
transitional economies have ample reason to share much of this literature's concern over
the apparent immutability of class structures in many nations. The perpetuation of stark
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divisions between social classes--between large holders of capital and wage earners,
between salaried professionals and the unemployed--may have negative impacts on
societal welfare for a number of reasons: The first and perhaps most obvious is the
societal tension and political destabilisation that results as wage earners organise against
owners of capital in conflict over shares of value-added created in the production process.
A class structure consisting of a few large holders of capital is also likely to foster the
emergence of monopolies and forestall the benefits that accrue from competition between
large numbers of enterprises. The new growth theory has brought to light an additional
benefit of an economy characterised by broadly-based capital holdings and large numbers
of firms: Innovation and the creation of new ideas and techniques are now seen as a
central cause of economic growth [Romer, 1990]; in a competitive economy
characterised by a large number of entrepreneurs, such innovation may be more likely to
occur. Finally, given the potential for moral hazard in the workplace, the hierarchical
structure of a large firm creates a principal-agent network of immense complexity, as
well as significant welfare losses in the form of supervision costs. In contrast, a selfemployed entrepreneur whose output directly enters his own utility function does not
require supervision or incentives to attain an optimum level of work effort.4
Roemer [1982] was the first to build a model which endogenously derived a class
structure in a capitalist economy based on unequal distribution of capital. Applying
Roemer's model to a sample of five hundred villages in West Bengal, Bardhan [1982]
showed that a class structure similar to that depicted by Roemer could be found within
rural Indian society.5
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Eswaran and Kotwal [1986] add an additional dimension to Roemer's model:
imperfect information in the form of monitoring costs. In their model of agrarian class
structure, they assume that capitalists (agricultural landholders) must supervise their
workers, who prefer leisure to labour, and therefore have an inherent tendency to shirk.
They achieve class formation as a function of access to physical capital, and from the
non-substitutability of hired labour for own labour. For example, a self-cultivator
(middle class) refrains from hiring a wage labourer at the point when the marginal
productivity of labour on his plot equals the going wage rate because the time-cost of
supervision by the self-cultivator must be added to the direct cost of hired labour.
The theoretical portion of this research begins in the framework of Eswaran and
Kotwal [1986], but adds to their work by suggesting that class structure is not determined
by physical capital alone, but by the combined interaction of physical and human capital.
Recent sociological analyses of class structure such as Wright [1997] have begun to place
an increasing emphasis on human capital as a determinant of class membership. The
inclusion of human capital in the analysis of class structure in developing countries has
become more important in recent decades. Centuries or even decades ago, ownership of
large amounts of land or capital may have constituted a necessary and sufficient
condition for membership in an upper class. Today, however, income-generating
potential is increasingly characterised by an individual's ability to interact with modern
technology and ideas. Clearly this ability is a function of the human capital embodied in
a worker's labour.
Further motivation for including human capital rather than only physical capital
or land in a model of class structure is its increasing importance in light of the heavy

3

migration to the large urban areas in developing countries. The urban share of the Third
World's population tripled in the middle half of the 20th century, increasing from 9.3 per
cent in 1925 to 28.0 per cent in 1975 [J. Williamson, 1988]. Especially in an urban
context, human capital may be equally important a determinant of income-generating
capability as physical capital. Thus, relative to the previously cited works that place their
analysis of class structure in an agrarian context, this analysis of class structure is
applicable to a more general and more modern developing country environment.
The first theoretical result of this research is that class structure mobility increases
significantly with the provision of access to credit. Access to credit has this effect since
through enterprise capitalisation, it changes an agent's optimal mode of labour activity.
For example, theoretical results of this research show that access to credit fosters
movement out of self-employment and into labour supervision. This result is confirmed
by first-hand survey data on class structure mobility collected in conjunction with
FUNDAP, a microenterprise credit program operating in western Guatemala. As a result,
empirical results from the Guatemalan survey data corroborate hypotheses developed in
the present paper and in previous work with respect to the positive effect of expanded
access to credit on upward class structure mobility.
Additional results of the paper focus on effect of human capital in the form of
formal schooling on class structure mobility. Theoretical results derived in this paper
predict that individuals with higher levels of human capital will expand employment
within their enterprises more rapidly if more human capital lowers the time cost of
supervision and administration in an enterprise. However, there are different components
to human capital. While one component of an entrepreneur's human capital comes from
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innate managerial ability, another component of an entrepreneur's human capital comes in
the form of formal schooling. Formal skills such as reading, writing and solving
mathematical problems are likely to augment an entrepreneur's innate managerial skills to
increase managerial efficiency.
Interestingly, the Guatemalan data used in this study suggest that it is these lessmeasurable characteristics of managerial ability rather than formal schooling which
interact with access to credit to foster upward class mobility. These characteristics of
human capital are difficult to identify, but may include personal attributes such as
Schumpeterian entrepreneurial drive, technical expertise within a given area of business,
or strong relational skills.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section II develops a model from
which membership by all agents in the economy in one of eight classes is endogenously
derived from a vector of exogenous physical and human capital endowments, (h, k).
Section III considers how membership within the class structure might change if agents
gain expanded access to credit from a microenterprise lending institution. Section IV
presents data on class structure mobility obtained first-hand through a credit survey
carried out by this researcher of 358 small businesses owners in western Guatemala.
Section V provides conclusions of the research and policy recommendations for targeted
credit programs in developing countries.

II. A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS CLASS STRUCTURE FORMATION
Following the general framework of Eswaran and Kotwal [1986], this paper presents a
partial equilibrium model of an economy of utility-maximising agents. These agents are
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constrained by time and by their endowments of physical and human capital. Utility is
given, for simplicity, in additive form as a function of income and leisure:
U (Y , l ) = Y + v ( l )

(1)

with v ′( l) > 0, v ′′( l) < 0, v ′( 0) = ∞, and v ′(1) > 0 . All agents have identical preferences
over leisure. The fact that utility is a linear function of income implies that all agents in
the economy are risk-neutral.
Production is given as a function of capital used in production, K, (which may
include land) and total efficiency units of labour, N.
q = θ F( K, N )

(2)

The production function is linear homogeneous. Derivatives of the function exhibit the
normal conditions: FN , K ( ⋅) > 0 , FNN , KK ( ⋅) < 0 , and FNK ( ⋅) > 0 . The symbol θ represents a

random shock with mean equal to one, which is intended to model uncertainty in
production of the agent's enterprise. Because of this uncertainty, it is impossible for the
owner of the enterprise to determine the amount of effort employed by hired workers.
The market price of output is set equal to one.
The productivity of a worker is a function of the level of his human capital, h.
This productivity is measured in efficiency units.6 The number of efficiency units of
labour applied to production in an enterprise is composed of the efficiency units of an
entrepreneur's own labour, x plus that from the labour of hired workers, z. Human capital
is distributed as an endowment across the economy to all agents i such that hi ∈ h , h .7
Efficiency units of an agent's labour are given by x = φ (hi ) , where φ ( ⋅)
transforms an agent's human capital into efficiency units with φ ′(hi ) > 0 . The number of
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n

( )

efficiency units hired by an enterprise in this model is generally given by z = ∑ φ h j ,
j =1

the sum of the number of hired workers, n, adjusted for the jth employed worker's level
of human capital. For simplicity, it is assumed that firms hire workers who are of a
homogenous level of human capital hj. The total number of efficiency units employed by
the firm, N, is then equal to

( )

N = x + z = φ (hi ) L + nφ h j

(3)

where L is the fraction of an agent's time labouring in her own enterprise.
A larger stock of human capital has three beneficial effects for an agent:
(1) It increases the efficiency units of some agent i labouring in his own firm by φ ′(hi ) .
(2) It lowers labour supervision costs by making agents better managers of employed
labour. (3) It increases the wage for the agent in the labour market. Wages are a positive
function of human capital, less a fixed supervision cost for all workers. These are
embodied in the wage function w( hi ) , and w' ( h) > 0 .
Time costs of supervision are given as a function of the supervising agent's human
capital,8 and as a function of the number of wage labourers hired, or
s = s(h, n)

(4)

where sn (h, n) > 0, sh (h, n) < 0, snh ( h, n) < 0, and snn (h, n) > 0 . The convexity of the
supervision function limits the scope of an enterprise despite linear homogeneity in
production.
Each agent is constrained by one unit of time in each period. This time can be
spent working in the agent's own enterprise, L, supervising hired labour, s, in outside
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wage employment, Lw, or enjoying leisure, l . Thus the time constraint for each agent in
the economy can be written as
Lw + L + s(h, n) + l = 1

(5)

Each agent is endowed with a fixed amount of capital k$ and a line of credit equal
to B. Added together, these equal k, the total amount of working capital available to the
agent. The capital k$ can be leased on the market at an interest rate r or used as capital in
production, K. As in the model of Eswaran and Kotwal, it is assumed here that all
working capital outlays are incurred at the start of the production period. In other words,
an agent is unable to use future profits from his enterprise as collateral against a loan.
The capital constraint faced by all agents is thus

(

)

( )

r k$ − K + w(hi ) Lw − nw h j + B ≥ 0

(6)

The capital constraint shows that net proceeds (costs) from leasing out (leasing) land
added to wage income plus net borrowing must be greater than or equal to the total wages
paid for hired labour. In practice we would expect B to be highly correlated with k$
because of the need for loans to be collateralised. For simplicity, the option of financing
production from past savings is excluded in this analysis.
By substituting equations (2) through (5) into (1), making them subject to the
working capital constraint given in (6), and constraining Lw, L, n ≥ 0, we obtain the
following maximisation problem for each agent in the economy:
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(

( ))

( )
− nw( h ) + B )

max U = F K , φ ( h) L + nφ h j + w( h) Lw + rk$ − nw h j − rK

Lw , L ,n , K ,λ

(

+ v (1 − Lw − L − s (h, n)) + λ r ( k$ − K ) + w(h) Lw

j

(7)

where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier.9 Differentiation of the maximisation problem in (7)
yields the first-order conditions of (8) through (12):
U Lw : w(h )(1 + λ ) − v′(l ) = 0

(8)

U L : Fx (K , N )φ (h ) − v′(l ) = 0

(9)

U n : Fz (K , N )φ (h j ) − w(h j )(1 + λ ) − s n (h, n )v′(l ) = 0

(10)

U K : FK ( K , N ) − r (1 + λ ) = 0

(11)

(

)

U λ : r kˆ − K + w(h )Lw − nw(h j ) + B = 0

(12)

These equations provide the framework for determining the labour activities of
individual agents given their exogenous endowment (h, k). There exists a unique utilitymaximising labour activity vector for each agent, given her capital endowment (h, k) and
the exogenous parameters of the model. In this analysis, like the Roemer and EswaranKotwal models, we have allowed three possible means of income generation:
employment as a wage earner, working as a self-employed labourer, and hiring and
supervising outside labour for work in one's own enterprise. In utility-maximising
equilibrium, each agent will optimally choose to engage in some combination of these
different modes of labour activity.
The model thus generates the following eight possible combinations of labour
activity for any agent, and their corresponding classes:
(I)

(0, 0, 0) Systemically Unemployed
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(II)

(Lw, 0, 0) Wage Earner

(III)

(Lw, L, 0) Credit-Constrained Entrepreneur

(IV)

(0, L, 0) Self-Employed Entrepreneur

(V)

(0, L, s) Small Enterprise Owner

(VI)

(Lw, L, s) Entrepreneurial Wage Earner

(VII) (Lw, 0, s) Capitalist Professional
(VIII) (0, 0, s) Large Capitalist
The optimality conditions derived from (7) determine how agents will sort
themselves out among these eight possible classes. A mapping of these classes in the
space of the endowment vector (h, k) is provided in Figure 1:

(traditional landed class)

k

k

(urban capitalist

(0, 0, s)

4

elite)

large capitalists

(0, L, s)

3

(L , 0, s)

small enterprise owners

w

capitalist
professionals.

(L ,L, s)
w

(0, L, 0)

entrepreneurial
wage earners

self-employed
entrepreneurs

k

credit-constrained
entrepreneurs

(L ,L, 0)

2

w

k
k

1

(0, 0, 0)

unemployed

h

h*

(wage labourers)

(L ,0, 0)
w

(professionals)

wage earners

_
h

h

Figure 1: Class Structure Map
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The complete mathematical proof of the class boundaries derived in the class
structure map will not be given here, but is provided in Wydick [1996]. However, the
intuition for the shape of the boundaries is the following: The boundaries upon which an
agent is indifferent between self-employment and labour supervision are downwardsloping, since increases in either human capital or physical capital will make hiring in
labour more attractive. Determining the slope of other boundaries requires assumptions
on the relative effects of increases in human capital on different labour activity. In the
class structure map in given in Figure 1 we assume that boundaries that separate wage
activity and self-employment are upward-sloping as fixed supervision costs stemming
from issues of moral hazard are likely to greatly reduce wages for low human capital
agents, while agents with high levels of human capital would be able to command a
premium wage in the labour market. Thus we would expect that holding k fixed,
increasing levels of h would induce labour market activity at the expense of selfemployed labour activity. The relative effects of human capital on the return to wage
labour and on labour supervision are more difficult to discern. In Figure 1 we assume
that increases in human capital have a neutral effect between reducing labour supervision
costs and increasing wages. These latter assumptions, however, are not critical to the
central analysis in this paper which will focus on the effect of increases in k to move
individuals out of labour market activity and into entrepreneurial activity, and the
combined affects of h and k in moving individuals from self-employment into labour
supervision.
Note that in contrast to previous models, this formulation generates a class of
unemployed agents possessing physical and human capital that is so low (k1 at h) that the
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return to non-labour activity exceeds the return to any of the three types of labour
activity. The boundaries for other classes begin at k2 through k4, at h and reflect an
optimal allocation of labour activity given any endowment of h and k.

III. THE IMPACT OF ACCESS TO CREDIT ON CLASS MEMBERSHIP
Substantial barriers in credit markets exist in developing countries that
substantially inhibit capital accumulation in the informal sector. Formal lending
institutions have a lamentable record of channeling credit to the poor in LDCs [World
Bank, 1989]. The primary reasons are asymmetric information barriers between
borrowers and lenders which give rise to adverse selection and moral hazard problems in
credit markets, and the high administrative costs to lenders for small loans
[Stiglitz, 1990]. This combination of prohibitively high monitoring costs per loan and
requirements for collateral prohibit a vast number of entrepreneurs from taking small
loans in formal financial markets. As development institutions have recognised the dire
implications of these credit constraints on economic growth, there has been in recent
years an explosion of credit programs in developing countries, targeting credit at those
shut out of formal financial markets.
The analysis in the remainder of this paper will focus on two possible policy goals
of credit expansion: (A) the effect of microenterprise lending on moving agents out of the
class of credit-constrained entrepreneurs (Lw, L, 0) into full-time entrepreneurial activity
in the form of (0, L, 0) and (0, L, s); and (B) the combined interaction of microenterprise
lending with the formal schooling component of h on movement into labour supervision,
or from (0, L, 0) to (0, L, s) and (0, 0, s).
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A. Credit-Constrained Entrepreneurs
The class of credit-constrained entrepreneurs (Lw, L, 0) are clearly one of the
groups of individuals most likely to benefit from a credit expansion program. Movement
of (Lw, L, 0) into (0, L, 0) through credit expansion is a worthy policy goal since it
reduces the efficiency loss from moral hazard in wage labour, and also may improve
income distribution by increasing the return to self-employed labour. A relevant policy
question is the extent to which better access to credit allows credit-constrained
entrepreneurs to become fully self-employed. Therefore, the first analysis of the
Guatemalan data will be to determine if sufficient increases in credit expansion allow
agents in the class of credit-constrained entrepreneurs to move into the class of selfemployed entrepreneurs. This will not only provide a test of hypotheses developed in
this paper (as seen in Figure 1), but also those previously put forth be Roemer [1982] and
Eswaran and Kotwal [1986].

B. Employment Generation in the Informal Sector
A primary goal of development policy makers involved in microenterprise
lending has been to stimulate job creation in impoverished regions through capitalisation
of the informal sector. Such a policy is designed to stimulate the demand for labour in
such areas, creating new employment, while putting upward pressure on the wage rate.
A question then emerges: to what type of individual should credit be expanded to
be consistent with this policy? The prediction from the model is that sufficient increases
in credit expansion will facilitate class structure mobility from (0, L, 0) to (0, L, s) and
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from (0, L, s) to (0, 0, s). Furthermore, as seen in Figure 1, fluidity of movement between
these classes will be positively affected by the level of human capital of the agent, i.e. the
class boundaries between (0, L, 0) / (0, L, s), and (0, L, s) / (0, 0, s) are downwardsloping in (h, k) space. The intuition behind this is the following: With an agent, for
example, on the boundary of (0, L, 0) / (0, L, s), a slight increase in human capital
endowment will make it marginally less costly to monitor a hired employee in terms of
the opportunity cost of the agent's time. A slight increase in physical capital endowment
or credit makes any potential hired labour marginally more productive, and thus induces
the agent to hire more labour.
However, it is almost tautological to argue that, after expanding credit access, we
should observe agents with greater human capital expanding employment within their
enterprises at a greater rate than those with lower levels of human capital. As noted
previously, there are more easily measurable components to human capital such as years
of formal schooling, and less measurable components such as technical know-how,
entrepreneurial drive, and personnel management skills. What is most interesting and
relevant in terms of policy implications is to focus on the more easily measurable
component of human capital, formal schooling, to determine if this component of human
capital that is observable to microenterprise lending institutions interacts with increased
credit access to expand employment creation in informal sector enterprises. If true, this
would have important implications for microenterprise lending policy in the informal
sector. To maximise the increase in demand for labour in a region, loans could be
targeted at those in the informal sector with higher levels of formal education. If this
hypothesis is not confirmed by the data, microenterprise programs may be able to meet
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these goals just as easily by granting loans to those who may even be illiterate and
struggle with the most basic mathematical skills, but are strong in the less measurable
components of human capital mentioned above.

IV. THE GUATEMALAN DATA
During the summer months of 1994 I designed and helped carry out first-hand
survey of 358 entrepreneurs in western Guatemala, primarily in and around the rural
towns of Quetzaltenango (population 96,000) and Totonicapan (population 9,000). Of
the 358 entrepreneurs interviewed in the survey, 236 were participants in a credit
program operated by FUNDAP, a Guatemalan credit institution operating in the region
that provides credit to small businesses. The remaining 122 entrepreneurs were
interviewed as a control group. These entrepreneurs were located in areas not reached by
FUNDAP and were highly credit-constrained. The surveys were administered at the
entrepreneur's location of business. Within the sample, 258 of the interviewees were
productores (light manufacturers) and 100 were commerciantes (retailers).
A classic problem with this kind of analysis is selection bias, i.e. borrowers in the
credit program may share personal characteristics which are different than that of the
control group. Although it is difficult to control for unobservable characteristics between
groups, Table 1 shows that at least the observable characteristics of the control group
were quite similar to those of FUNDAP borrowers.10 The average age of both groups
was approximately 36 years old. Average (pre-credit) monthly sales were approximately
US$371 for FUNDAP borrowers and US$432 for members of the control group.
Average formal education was 3.26 years for FUNDAP borrowers and 4.86 years for
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those in the control group. Thus if differences exist between the control group and the
treatment group, it would appear that the control group would be slightly a more educated
and higher income group. Of the entire sample interviewed 101 were female and 257
were male, this ratio holding roughly the same for both groups.
The average size of a recipient's initial loan from FUNDAP was the equivalent of
US$115, ranging from a minimum of $18 to a maximum in the sample of $545 (σ = $61).
FUNDAP routinely rewards timely repayment by allowing outstanding balances to be
rolled over into a subsequent loan and by regular increases in the size of loans.
The positive impact of the loans was obvious by simple examination of the
change in gross revenues over time between the businesses with access to credit and
those without. The average time that the 236 FUNDAP borrowers had been receiving
credits was 2.33 years. Among FUNDAP borrowers, average gross revenues were $371
per month before receiving loans from FUNDAP, but this figure had increased to $658
by the time of the interviews. In contrast, entrepreneurs in the control group realised an
increase in average gross revenues from $432 per month to only $452 per month during
the three years before the time of the interview.
While it is possible to argue that such differences could be caused by differences
in unobservable characteristics between the treatment and control groups, close
examination of the data indicate that this is unlikely. If credit access were not largely
responsible for differences in class structure mobility between groups, we would then at
least expect to see similarities in changes over time between the most upwardly mobile
members of control group and those of the treatment group. However as Table 1
indicates, while the top ten per cent of entrepreneurs in the control group showed a net
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increase in hired labour of 1.9 employees over three years, this average was equaled by
roughly the top fifty per cent of the treatment group. Gross sales statistics confirm this
phenomenon. While the top ten per cent of the control group increased gross sales over
the period in question by 125 per cent, the top ten per cent of the treatment group
increased gross sales by 240 per cent. Thus even upon comparing members of both
groups who would be most likely to share unobservable characteristics (such as
entrepreneurial drive, ambition, etc.) we see significantly higher upward mobility in
entrepreneurs with access to credit.
How does the data on class structure mobility compare to the predictions of the
model? Tables IA-B to 3A-B illustrate class structure mobility in the treatment group
and control groups in a Class Structure Mobility Matrix (CSMM). These tables show
class structure mobility among 107 productores in the sample who had been recipients of
credit from FUNDAP for two to three years and class structure mobility over three years
for another group of 56 productores who were owners of businesses in areas not yet
reached by the credit program. Because FUNDAP lends only to entrepreneurs with
existing businesses, and because no instances of membership in (Lw, 0, s) were found in
the survey, class membership in the sample was limited to the classes (Lw, L, 0),
(Lw, L, s), (0, L, 0), (0, L, s), and (0, 0, s).11

Table 2A presents a CSMM which

compares the class mobility of the 107 productores who had access to credit from the
lending institution for two to three years up to mid-1994 with a group of 56 productores
in Table 2B who had no access to credit during the previous three years.
(Insert Tables 2A and 2B here)
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The greater class mobility by the group of entrepreneurs with access to credit is
readily apparent by comparing Tables 2A and 2B. While the largest elements of the
CSMM in Table 2B tend to be located on the diagonal, indicating class stagnation,
Table 2A portrays a relatively dynamic class structure in which the largest elements in
each row tend to be located to the right of the diagonal. Comparison between the two
tables shows the greater rate at which entrepreneurs with access to credit moved out of
part-time wage-earning activity into full-time self-employment than those without credit.
The greatest difference between the groups is in mobility between the classes (0, L, 0)
and (0, L, s). While the vast majority of those with access to credit moved into laboursupervising activity, only a minority of those without access to credit were able to move
out of full-time self-employment. The impact of access to credit on class structure
mobility does, however, appear to wane at higher levels of capitalisation. While class
movement between (0, L, 0) and (0, L, s) is relativity fluid, mobility between (0, L, s) and
(0, 0, s) is much less so, perhaps because of diminishing returns to labor or convexity in
supervision costs.
The effect of formal schooling on class structure mobility can be seen in Tables
3A-B and 4A-B. The CSMMs presented in Tables 3A-B show the difference in class
structure mobility between those with access to credit and the control group among
entrepreneurs with four or more years of formal education. Tables 4A-B provide the same
analysis of entrepreneurs with less than four years of formal education.
(Insert Tables 3A-B and Tables 4A-B here)
It is interesting to compare class structure mobility between entrepreneurs with
four or more years of schooling and those with three or fewer years of formal schooling
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(who both enjoyed access to credit) in the CSMMs in Tables 3A and 4A. Note that the
rate of movement into supervisory modes of labour activity was actually greater among
the entrepreneurs with less formal education than for the more educated sub-group.
Before receiving access to credit, 41.4 per cent of the more educated entrepreneurs were
members of (0, L, s) or (0, 0, s), and only 34.8 per cent of the less-educated group were
members of (0, L, s) and (0, 0, s), which is consistent with the class structure map
presented in Figure 1. However, at the end of the transition period, 71.2 per cent of the
less-educated group were members of these ‘higher level’ classes, while this was true for
only 65.8 per cent of the entrepreneurs with a greater amount of formal education! In
addition only one entrepreneur out of fourteen of the more educated group made the
transition from (0, L, s) to (0, 0, s) (to the ‘large capitalist’ class), while four out of 23 in
the less educated group were able to make the transition.
A study of the tables shows that there also appears to be some degree of
substitutability of human capital for physical in class structure mobility. Upward
mobility is clearly greater in the CSMM in Table 3B than in Table 4B. Without access to
credit, the more highly educated entrepreneurs appear to be able to expand businesses
over time at a greater rate than the less-educated entrepreneurs without access to credit.
Nevertheless, the Guatemalan data show class mobility among this group to be much less
fluid than among the groups with access to credit.
Class stagnation is especially notable in the CSMM in Table 4B, which shows
class movement among the less-educated productores without access to credit. Not
surprisingly, none of these entrepreneurs begins the period with membership in (0, 0, s).
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Moreover, none of the entrepreneurs who begin in the class (0, L, s) is able to transition
to (0, 0, s) by the end of the three-year period.
More formal testing of the model presented in Section III of this paper was carried
out in the form of logit estimations taken on the probability of different measures of
upward class structure mobility subject to measures of credit access and a vector of
control variables. Table 5 presents two different specifications which test for the effect
access to credit and formal education (and the interaction between these variables) on
class structure mobility. The specification given in estimations (1) and (3) tests the effect
of credit access (represented by a dummy variable) on FUNDAP borrowers who had
been provided access to credit for either two or three years relative to changes in class
structure mobility of the control group over three years.
The second type of specification, given in estimations (2) and (4), shows the
impact of successive years of credit access on class structure mobility. The gradual and
sequential implementation of FUNDAP's microenterprise program into different village
areas allowed for a kind of natural experiment on the effect of additional years of credit
access. FUNDAP borrowers had received access to credit for varying lengths of time.
Some households happened to be located in areas in which FUNDAP had carried out
lending operations since its foundation in 1988. Other households were located in
village areas where FUNDAP had recently initiated lending activity only within the last
twelve months. Others were in areas in which the institution had begun lending
operations for the period in between. What is more, an important part of FUNDAP's
credit policy is to increase a borrower’s access to credit at a relatively slow pace over a
sequence of loans. Thus FUNDAP's slow and sequential introduction of credit into

20

different areas in western Guatemala, combined with its lending policy to its borrowers,
provided a valuable instrument, years of credit access, for ascertaining the impact of
varying degrees of access to credit. The logit estimations in (2) and (4) are of the form

 P
log i
 1 − Pi


 = α + β 1k i + β 2 ki h + ψ y i


where ki represents years of credit access, hi represents years of formal schooling, yi is a
vector of control variables, α, β1 and β2 are estimated parameters, and ϕ is a vector of
estimated parameters. Estimated values of β1 and β2 are thus intended to capture the
effect of credit access and the interaction of credit access with schooling on class
structure mobility respectively. Estimations in (1) and (3) substitute a dummy variable
for ki to represent credit access. Estimation (5) uses Ordinary Least Squares to ascertain
the effect of additional years of credit access on net changes in hired labour.
The logit estimations in (1) and (2) attempt to capture the impact of credit access
and formal schooling on movement out wage labour activity (Lw) and into selfemployment. The coefficient on credit access has the correct sign, and would indicate a
very plausible 10 per cent increase in probability of moving out of wage labour activity
for every additional year of credit access, but is statistically insignificant. Years of
formal schooling also appear to have an insignificant effect on movement out of wage
labour activity; this may be expected, however, given the high opportunity cost of leaving
the often higher-paying jobs associated with more years of formal education.
The estimations in (3) and (4) illustrate the highly significant effect of credit
access in moving individual borrowers from self-employment into labour supervision.
The estimations are carried out on 107 initially self-employed productores, and show that
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two years of credit access results in a probability increase of 40 per cent of taking on
hired labour. Results also are indicative of diminishing returns to years of credit access;
the squared term is negative and is statistically significant in estimation (4). Again,
formal schooling, if anything, is shown to have a negative effect on adding hired labour
to an enterprise--a surprising yet interesting result which points to the importance of the
less observable aspects of human capital relative to formal schooling in microenterprise
management in developing countries. The coefficient estimations in (5) again point to
the beneficial effects of credit access on employment generation in microenterprises. On
average, three years of credit access produces a net increase of one full-time position for
a hired labourer. Moreover, although results indicate that younger borrowers may be
more likely to create employment given access to credit, gender plays no significant role
in employment generation. The Guatemalan data indicate that enterprise expansion and
upward class mobility is just as prevalent among women with access to credit as among
men. Thus the results from this study indicate that, given access to credit, a female
entrepreneur with little or no formal education is as likely to add hired labour to an
enterprise as a male entrepreneur with substantially higher levels of formal education,
and is more likely to increase the scope of her enterprise given greater credit access.

V. CONCLUSIONS FOR CREDIT POLICY
This paper has shown that a class structure consisting of eight classes emerges
endogenously based on individual endowments of human and physical capital. Class
structure mobility as portrayed in the Guatemalan data corroborate the hypothesis
developed in this paper and in previous research that demonstrate the positive impact of
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microenterprise lending on class structure mobility. Access to credit clearly appears to
foster movement from self-employment to labour supervision, although results in this
paper cannot strongly confirm the effect of credit access in moving individuals from
wage labour activity into self-employment.
The effect of human capital on the dynamics of class mobility among individuals
who have been provided access to credit is more interesting, but somewhat less clear.
Formal schooling appears to have very little impact on upward class mobility for smallscale entrepreneurs in Guatemala. Even the interaction between formal schooling, credit
access, and upward class mobility is quite weak statistically. We would expect greater
levels of human capital to lower supervision and administrative costs so that credit
targeted at highly educated entrepreneurs should foster more rapid enterprise growth.
However, the Guatemalan data indicate that access to credit seems to unleash an
entrepreneurial drive in certain individuals that is independent of formal education. For
these individuals supervision costs appear to be relatively flat up to perhaps three or four
employees. However, the data also indicate that convexities in supervision costs may
kick in shortly after this point, i.e. the data show much more rapid class movement from
self-employment to supervision of one to four workers than after this point.
Policy recommendations for development institutions follow from the results of
this research. Microenterprise lending institutions should not fear that lending to lesseducated borrowers would stifle their ability to generate employment in the informal
sector. A potential caveat to this, however, is that those with more schooling may be
more likely to innovate and adopt new technology and ideas, and thus establish
enterprises with greater potential for long-term growth. However, the empirical findings
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from the Guatemalan data suggest that in small, informal sector enterprises, formal
education is not a good indicator of entrepreneurial human capital. Instead,
microenterprise programs should try to target credit at the Schumpeterian entrepreneur,
the small-scale manufacturer with practical human resource management and
administrative skills, and a predilection for expanding production and reaching into new
markets.
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Table 1--Descriptive Statistics

Variable
years of credit access
years of formal
education
age
fraction urban
borrowers
fraction male
borrowers
Fraction
manufacturers
mean net hired labour
added:
--top 10%
--top 20%
--top 50%
mean % increase in
gross sales:
--top 10%
--top 20%
--top 50%
Source: 1994 Guatemala field survey.

Control group
2.32

treatment group
0

4.86

3.26

37.13
46.57

36.11
24.05

75.34

76.89

72.60

76.79

1.94
1.25
0.80

3.34
2.69
1.92

125%
95%
45%

240%
150%
75%

Table 2A
Productores with Access to Credit:
Class Mobility over 2-3 Years

Subsequent Class Membership

(Lw, L, 0)

(Lw, L,
1

(Lw, L,
3

25

(0, L, 0)
1

(0, L, s)
5

(0, 0, s)
0

total
10

Initial

(Lw, L, s)

0

3

1

6

0

10

Class

(0, L, 0)

2

2

15

28

0

47

Membership

(0, L, s)

0

1

4

27

5

37

(0, 0, s)

0

0

0

0

3

3

total:

3

9

21

66

8

107

Table 2B
Productores with No Access to Credit:
Class Mobility Over 3 Years

Subsequent Class Membership

(Lw, L, 0)
Initial

(Lw, L, s)

Class

(0, L, 0)

Membership

(Lw, L, 0)
1
1
0

(Lw, L, s)
0

(0, L, 0)
1

4

1

1

15

(0, L, s)
2

(0, 0, s)
0

1
6

0
0

total
4
7
22

(0, L, s)

0

1

1

16

3

21

(0, 0, s)

0

0

0

1

1

2

2

6

18

26

4

56

Source: 1994 Guatemala field survey.

Table 3A
Class Mobility of Productores with Four or More Years
of Formal Schooling and with Access to Credit:

Subsequent Class Membership

26

(Lw, L, 0)

(Lw, L, 0) (Lw, L, s) (0, L, 0)
1
2
0

(0, L, s)
3

(0, 0, s)
0

total
6

Initial

(Lw, L, s)

0

0

1

1

0

2

Class

(0, L, 0)

0

2

6

8

0

16

Membership

(0, L, s)

0

0

2

11

1

14

(0, 0, s)

0

0

0

0

3

3

1

4

9

23

4

41

Table 3B
Class Mobility of Productores with Four or More Years
of Formal Schooling Lacking Access to Credit:

Subsequent Class Membership

(Lw, L, 0)

(Lw, L,
1

(Lw, L,
0

(0, L, 0)
1

(0, L, s)
1

(0, 0, s)
0

total
3

Initial

(Lw, L, s)

1

1

1

0

0

3

Class

(0, L, 0)

0

0

7

4

0

11

Membership

(0, L, s)

0

1

1

9

3

14

(0, 0, s)

0

0

0

1

1

2

2

2

10

15

4

32

Source: 1994 Guatemala field survey.

Table 4A
Class Mobility of Productores with Three or Fewer Years
of Formal Schooling and with Access to Credit:

Subsequent Class Membership

27

(Lw, L, 0)

(Lw, L, 0) (Lw, L, s) (0, L, 0)
0
1
1

(0, L, s) (0, 0, s)
2
0

Total
4

Initial

(Lw, L, s)

Class

(0, L, 0)

2

0

9

20

0

31

Membership

(0, L, s)

0

1

2

16

4

23

(0, 0, s)

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

5

12

43

4

66

0

3

0

5

0

8

Table 4B
Class Mobility of Productores with Three or Fewer Years
of Formal Schooling Lacking Access to Credit:

Subsequent Class Membership

(Lw, L, 0)

(Lw, L, 0) (Lw, L, s) (0, L, 0)
0
0
0

(0, L, s)
1

(0, 0, s)
0

total
1

Initial

(Lw, L, s)

0

3

0

Class

(0, L, 0)

0

1

8

Membership

(0, L, s)

0

0

0

7

0

7

(0, 0, s)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

8

11

0

23

Source: 1994 Guatemala field survey.

28

1
2

0
0

4
11

Table 5--Estimation Results

Variable

(1) Movemen
t out of Lw

(2) Movemen
t out of Lw

(3) Movemen
t into S

(4) Movemen
t into S

(5) (OLS)
Net Inc. H.
Labour

constant

1.299 (0.37)

3.169 (1.20)

-0.826 (0.69)

-1.617 (1.22)
1.235 (1.85)
*
-0.145
(-0.84)

0.150 (0.3
9)
0.341 (2.7
6)***
-0.030
(-1.73)*

0.067 (0.47)

0.011 (0.4
0)
-0.006
(-0.54)
-0.010 (1.48)
-0.139
(-0.76)

years of credit
access
years of credit
access squared
2-3 years credit
access dummy
years of formal
education
years of educ ×
years of credit
age (years)

0.454 (0.62)
-0.030 (0.23)
1.183 (0.37)
-0.144 (0.78)
0.03
(0.29)
-0.028 (0.70)
0.837 (0.73)

-0.151 (0.87)
0.022
(0.24)
-0.032 (0.86)
0.092 (0.10)

male
borrower (dummy)

0.099 (0.09)

-0.654 (0.79)

Manufacturer (du
mmy)
sample size:

-0.649 (0.37)
36

-1.043 (0.63)

urban
borrower (dummy)

53

1.097 (2.09)
**
-0.052 (0.44)
-0.052
(-0.90)
0.002 (0.07)

-0.126
(-1.69)*
0.002 (0.08)

-0.512
(-0.75)

-0.569
(-0.75)

0.227 (0.43)

0.156 (0.29)

0.089 (0.6
1)
0.71 (4.02
)***

107

107

171

* Significant at the 10 percent level of confidence

** Significant at the 5 percent level of confidence
*** Significant at the 1 percent level of confidence

Source: 1994 Guatemala field survey.

1

The Grameen Bank, operating in Bangladesh, for example now has a clientele of over 2 million borrowers
while boasting a repayment rate of 99 per cent. Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank
now estimates that there are approximately 6 million participants in microenterprise credit programs in
developing and transitional economies (National Times, February 1997).

2

New York Times, January 26, 1997.

3

The study of class structure has its origins in Marxian dialectical thought. The emergence of a class
structure is a well-known a focal point in Marx's analysis of capitalist society (see Marx, Karl. Das Kapital.
(1867) Chicago: Gateway, 1970). Later both Lenin and Mao categorised the class divisions they observed
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in their respective societies in terms of labour activity (see Lenin, Vladamir. The Development of
Capitalism in Russia. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1899. and Mao Tse-Tung. ‘Analysis of the Classes in
Chinese Society.’ in Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1926).
4

Clearly this welfare loss from supervision costs needs to be with balanced with the efficiency gains from
the economies of scale found in many industries.
5

The statistics from the sample suggested that 0.2 per cent of the households responding fit the
characteristics of the capitalist landlord, 14.3 per cent were rich farmers, 29.2 per cent were family farmers,
8.7 per cent were poor peasants, and 35.9 per cent matched the description of landless labourers. The
residual 11.7 per cent were made up of those who engaged in no income earning activity during the sample
period, or were involved in all three of the income-earning activities in Roemer's model, a proposition
which was excluded by Roemer's assumption that own labour and hired labour were perfect substitutes.
6

In this model ‘efficiency units’ refers to a worker's potential productivity given his level of human capital;
it is not related to the degree of effort used in work.
7

The rationale for treating adult human capital as an exogenous endowment in this model is the following:
First, because of the limited resources of most LDCs, opportunities for educational investment are far from
evenly distributed across the population; the supply and location of educational institutions is heavily
influenced by circumstance and political whim (Foster 1983). This is particularly the case in Guatemala.
Moreover, in the narrower context of this research, since FUNDAP's stated objective is to lend equally
freely to borrowers regardless of educational background, access to credit and educational level are
independent of one another, and can be viewed as co-determinants of class structure membership.
8

For notational simplicity the subscript i will be dropped from this point forward although for clarity the
subscript j will continue to represent hired agents.
The parameter θ reflecting uncertainty in production will be suppressed in the remainder of the analysis as
it does not play a substantial role with the absence of risk-aversion in the utility functions of agents.

9

10

One might think that recipients of FUNDAP loans might be a self-selected sample of aggressive
entrepreneurs eager to expand their businesses relative to a more passive control group. However, during
the survey, members of the control group in fact were highly enthusiastic about the possibility of receiving
credit from FUNDAP, but to that point had been denied credit due to their location in areas yet unserved by
the credit program.
11

Since an entrepreneur's labour activity in firms with approximately five or more employees was observed
to become primarily supervisory and administrative, these individuals were classified as (0, 0, s).
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